The Secret of Success: The Small-Section First-Year Skills Offering and Its Relationship to Independent Thinking by Moliterno, James E.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1990
The Secret of Success: The Small-Section First-Year
Skills Offering and Its Relationship to Independent
Thinking
James E. Moliterno
Copyright c 1990 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Moliterno, James E., "The Secret of Success: The Small-Section First-Year Skills Offering and Its Relationship to Independent






The Secret of Success: 
NUMBER 4 
The Small-Section First-Year 
Skills Offering and Its 
Relationship to Independent Thinking 
by James E. Moliterno· 
Many of the chief benefits to first year law students of small-section 
skills teaching1 are well recognized: the students acquire writing and 
analytical skills; the teaching presents opportunities for critique of law 
practice;2 the students' competence in their eventual practice is enhanced. But 
among the most valuable benefits of such teaching, both to students and to 
legal education, is one that is all too often overlooked: such teaching provides 
crucial opportunities for students to experience meaningful success early in 
"Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Legal Skills Program at the 
College of William and Mary. I would like to thank Professor Paul A. LeBel, 
Professor John M. Levy, and Allen Black for their comments on drafts of this essay. 
1. Although I discuss the need to experience success in the context of a skills 
development program, these same needs could certainly be fulfilled in any small 
section first year course in which individual attention could be provided and early 
student work could be generated, critiqued, and returned. 
2. See Condlin, "Taste's Great, Less Filling:" The Law School Clinic and 
Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 45 (1986). Professor Kenney Hegland reminds 
us to attend as well to the university law school's purpose of preserving and expanding 
the current state of knowledge. See Heglund, Condlin's Critique of Conventional 
Clinics: The Case of the Missing Case, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 427, 427 n.2 (1986). 
Although both Condlin and Hegland are discussing the purposes of law school clinical 
programs, many of the same opportunities for critique 9f the profession and expansion 
of the current state of lawyer skills knowledge attend the well-constructed first year 
skills development program. It is in such a program that students receive their first 
look at the work and life of a lawyer. 
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their legal education. Without small section classes in which timely response , 
to early student-work can be provided, first year law students have unaccept-
ably few opportunities to experience meaningful success, and as a result have 
a much diminished chance of developing into the independent, critical thinkers 
we all hope that they will become.3 
Every teacher knows the good feeling of seeing a student's "light go on;" 
this observation is so gratifying because as teachers we enjoy seeing our 
students succeed and we recognize the growth in the student with each 
success. The most gratifying and valuable of these experiences, for both 
student and teacher, are those in which the student has solved a problem in a 
creative way and has now realized that such creativity and independence of 
thought are central to successful legal thinking. Unfortunately, law teachers 
know not only the good feeling of seeing a student succeed, but also know 
that this experience is all too infrequent in a one hundred person class. After 
all, in the large class, how many students participate, let alone succeed, per 
'day? How clear can the reaction of the teacher be to an individual student's 
success? How much effort can be expended to lead a single student to that 
success in the middle of a one hundred person, fifty minute class? How much 
benefit do non-participating students receive from the occasional success of 
another? 
Law learning differs from the students' prior educational experiences. 
Nearly every entering law student leaves an educational environment in which 
acquisition of information was the paramount goal of learning. They enter the 
very different educational environment of the law school in which acquisition 
of information is a preliminary step toward the goal of developing abilities of 
analytical, critical thinking.4 Entering students know that, while all their new 
classmates were successful elsewhere, not all will succeed in law school. We 
tell them and popular literature tells them that they will be learning a new way 
of thinking. As exhilarating as this prospect might be, it remains a rather 
frightening notion to most first year students. As a result, for all their former 
successes, entering law students tend to be an insecure bunch. Even among 
the most talented of beginning students, insecurity is the dominant feeling in 
the first months of law school. Among my most able students in my eight 
years of teaching first year students is a highly intelligent, self-confident, 
commander of Coast Guard ships who confesses, "The frustration in the first 
year was in never knowing what was right. I was not so much concerned with 
being 'right' in class as with knowing whether I was 'getting it': whether my 
3. For an interesting treatment of the kinds of teaching that are more likely than 
others to produce this kind of thinker, see D' Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law 
Teaching in an Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 461 (1987). 
4. For an indictment of university teaching and its disastrous effect on students' 
perspective on what "learning" means, see id. at 464-65. · 
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understanding of the law, beyond the black letter law in our course-work, 
would equate to success or failure on exams." 
Some would argue, I suspect, that this insecurity is desirable: it makes 
the students work hard and it generates the first year student's zeal. It also 
may be true that the tension that beginning students feel and that some 
teachers so successfully nurture results in an initial imbalance on the part of 
the students that allows the adept teacher to challenge their settled ways of 
thinking. Standing alone, however, this phenomenon is unlikely (especially in 
the modern, highly competitive law school environment) to get a group of 
insecure students successfully through a semester without sending many or 
most of them retreating to the safety of looking exclusively to courts and 
professors and commercial outlines to discover what the student himself or 
herself "thinks." Opportunities in addition to those few provided by the large 
section classes are needed for students to see that thinking critically and 
independently is "right." Without such opportunities, too many of the students 
for whom the imbalance may have initially created a positive learning 
environment will never have realized the benefits of their critical, independent 
moments, and their ability and willingness to "go out on a limb" intellectually 
will be greatly inhibited. 
Professor Anthony D' Amato has argued convincingly that the best law 
teaching is that which challenges the students' established ways of thinking, 
provides no clear "answer" to student questions, and expects students to 
complete the learning process upon later, probably private, reflection.5 
(D' Amato's "Professor Smith" teaches in this way while his "Professor Jones" 
is quick to give positive re-enforcement by way of summarizing the black 
letter response given by students in the class.t Although I agree with many 
of Professor D' Amato's premises and much of his reasoning, I reach the 
conclusion that Marvin Minsky's work,' upon which much of Professor 
D'Amato's argumentis based,8 leads more clearly to the conclusion that the 
best law learning happens when a student successfully solves a problem by 
creative thinking, articulates the process by which this positive result was 
achieved, and a teacher responds that the student's independent thoughts have 
value. Professor D' Amato emphasizes the first two of these three conditions 
and, in giving little attention to the third, seems to assume that the student will 
know when the student has done it right. In Minsky's terms: 
Whenever you "get a good idea," solve a problem, or have a memorable 
experience, you activate a K[nowledge]-line to "represent" it. A K-line is 
5. ld. at 476-77. 
6. Id. at 467-83. 
7. M. MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF THE MIND (1986). 
8. D'Amato, supra note 3, at 461. 
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a wire-like structure that attaches itself to whichever mental agents are 
active when you solve a problem or have a good idea. When you activate 
that K-line later, the agents attached to it are aroused, putting you in a 
"mental state" much like the one you were in when you solved that problem 
or got that idea. This should make it relatively easy for you to solve new, 
similar problems!9 
I agree with Professor D' Amato that if forced to choose between his 
"Professor Smith and Professor Jones," Smith is the one more likely to 
activate a K-line and whose teaching in the context of the traditional first year 
substantive law courses should be preferred. But the choice is not exclusively 
between Smiths and Joneses. The difficulty of allowing Smith's technique to 
stand alone is that too many students will never realize that this freedom to 
think independently is a good thing and will return to the comfort of 
information worship without the real benefit of Smith's technique taking hold. 
In his indictment of undergraduate teaching, Professor D 'Amato says that 
unlike study in other disciplines, "[s]tudying mathematics by problem-solving 
is ... the very best model for studying law."10 I agree. Smith's students 
solve problems on their own as do mathematics students and gain value from 
that activity. But the analogy between mathematics teaching and Smith's 
teaching breaks down in a significant way: Smith's students are unlikely to 
receive any response from Smith to their tentative ventures into creative 
problem-solving while a key feature of mathematics teaching is the review in 
class of the methods used by various students to solve the problem in 
.question, with the best mathematics teachers responding favorably to the 
student's creativity. ~his sort of response is a necessary element of law 
learning, as well. 
Anyone who has taught a first year skills course (and probably anyone 
who has taught substantive law) has taught the student who has come to the 
office while working on some writing project to ask, "Is it alright for me to 
say that the court in X v. Y is wrong?" or "Can I argue such-and-such if I 
can't find a case that says it?" In addition to the substantive response to the 
point the student proposes making, a paraphrase of the appropriate teacher 
response to such a student is "I like the way you're thinking." This same 
student, while perhaps hearing the Professor Smith (though probably not 
Jones) in the substantive law course say that courts are sometimes wrong, will 
not articulate such an independent thought without some sort of explicit 
authorization. Without articulating the thought and receiving a positive 
response to it, something that would probably not happen but for the 
assignment and receptive atmosphere of the small section class, that student 
9. MINSKY, supra note 7, at 82, quoted in D'Amato, supra note 3, at 463. 
10. D'Amato supra note 3, at 465 n.B. 
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would not have had the new K-line created because to the student's mind, no 
problem would have been solved, no good idea would have been had. The 
moment of creativity would have been for naught. None of the benefits 
described by Minsky and hoped-for by Professor D' Amato would have 
accrued. As a result, students need the opportunity to experience problem-
solving in the contexts common to the lawyer's work, to articulate the mental 
processes they use to solve the problem, and to be told which aspects of their 
problem-solving process were successful.11 Indeed, these opportunities to 
experience success will likely make the students both more receptive to 
Smith's teaching style and more able to achieve the valuable learning that 
Smith hopes the students will achieve upon reflection outside of his classroom. 
They will be more receptive to Smith's teaching because now that their 
independent thought processes have been granted imprimatur, they will more 
likely see that Smith is not "hiding the ball," but is providing valuable 
opportunities for students to exercise their new independence. Smith needs 
the success the students experience in the skills course, and the skills course 
needs Smith to challenge the students' mental pathways, initially freeing them 
from their mental straightjackets and providing the opportunity to engage in 
independent thinking that can be validated by the small-section skills 
teacher.12 
Without these opportunities to experience success, students exhibit all the 
behaviors that law teachers (especially Smiths) moan about in faculty lounges: 
"they worship and can't question judicial opinion;" "they are unwilling to 
challenge me no matter how outrageous a statement I make." These are highly 
predictable behaviors for insecure individuals who have no idea of how to 
succeed in this new environment nor of whether they are worthy of thinking 
independent thoughts about these somewhat mysterious topics. The initial 
pressure the students feel just to figure out what a "tort" is militates against 
their having any creative thoughts about the subject. These behaviors should 
not be at all unexpected; education researchers have concluded that creative 
thinking is enhanced by successful thinking experiences and is inhibited by 
11. As is true for many of us, I suspect, I emulate in my teaching, to the extent 
I am able, a favorite teacher of mine. My model was a faculty member who was my 
clinic supervisor. In his critique of my work, he was always able to lead me to new 
ways of thinking about a client's problem in such a manner that, after the critique 
session, I was sure that I had generated the new ways of thinking myself. (Had I?) 
In any event, although my mathematics training prepared me well, I cut my creative 
thinking teeth by dint of this teacher's efforts. 
12. In fact, I am not convinced that any substantive distinction warrants the 
general use of the term skills teacher. See Molitemo, Goodness and Humanness: 
Distinguishing Traits?, 19 N.M.L. REV. 203 (1989). 
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fear of failure and pressure to conform to peers for the sake of educational 
survival.13 
The need to think creatively is more critical in the case of legal thinking 
than it is in many other fields. The essence of the legal thought process is the 
challenge of the expected response.14 I use the word "challenge" here not to 
mean unnecessarily aggressive, adversarial, quibbling behavior, 15 but to refer 
to the students' need when questioned to be willing to consider and reflect on 
possible answers that lack intuitive appeal. The latter sort of challenge requires 
a bit of courage on the part of the student-thinker: a courage that is least 
likely to come if the first and only opportunity for the student's thinking to 
be evaluated will be a single, end-of-course, winner-take-all written examina-
tion.16 Fear of failure will be a most powerful inhibitor of creativity in such 
a system. How many risk-takers will be found in the group of one hundred 
under such a regime? For a student to be willing to take risk, to challenge 
the standard course of things, the student must be emboldened at some time 
and by some means before tackling the examination. Barring a revolution in 
legal education that would see a five-fold reduction in the average first year 
class size, the most likely opportunity for such an effect to be had on students' 
willingness to think independently, indeed the only such opportunity that is 
currently in place at most law schools, is to be found in the first-year skills 
development offering. 
Faculty involved in designing such an offering should be sensitive to the 
need to structure incremental assignments, not only to allow .students to 
13. See B.S. BLOOM AND L. BRODER, PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESSES OF COllEGE 
STUDENTS, (1950); A. Goor and R. Summerfield, A Comparison of Problem-Solving 
Processes of Creative Students and Non-Creative Students, 61 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 
495 (1975), cited in Nickerson, On Improving Thinking Through Instruction, 15 REV. 
RES. EDqc. 3, 25 (1988-89). Nickerson says that students "must get the kind of 
feedback from instructors and peers that will reward effort and good thinking, 
including good questioning, at least as much as right answers." Nickerson, supra at 39. 
See also T. AMABILE, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 74-75, 160 (1983), 
for a summary of research regarding the detrimental effects fear of failure has on 
creativity. 
14. D'Amato, supra note 3, at 462. 
~5. For a fascinating proposal that would make such behavior unethical when 
unsupported by the policies underlying the relied upon legal rule, see Hegland, 
Quibbles, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1491 (1989). 
16. "If legal education is to retain its vitality ... we must do everything in our 
power to remove the incubus of the examination .... " The mind that "is oriented 
toward examinations is not" that of the creative, independent thinking student, but "is 
a mind that has to ask itself anxiously at every tum that most inhibitive of questions, 
'What will other people think?'" L. Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REV, 35, 
43 (1950). 
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succeed but to be challenged by successive projects. For example, if an initial 
writing assignment asks the students to explain a known legal rule based on 
a limited set of resource materials, a second might ask the students to apply 
a known rule to a set of problem facts, a third might ask them to predict the 
outcome of the rule's application to a more problematic set of facts, and a 
fourth might ask the students to derive rather than merely apply a legal rule 
from a set of resource materials. Success is empty without challenge; no one 
grows by accomplishing simple tasks effortlessly. 
Further, such teachers need to be sensitive to the fact that 11experiencing 
success11 does not simply mean the receipt of undue praise by students who 
have reached the legally correct <;:onclusion in writing a memorandum of law, 
for example, nor encouragement of the smugness that sometimes attends the 
11beating" of an opponent in a trial or negotiation exercise. Instead, the success 
to be most rewarded and encouraged is the student's expression of an 
independent thought; the teacher must be sensitive to praising student 
expression of such a thought, encouraging such thinking by their comments, 
and creating a non-threatening environment in which the expression of such 
a thought is more likely. Faculty not active in courses offering these 
opportunities should appreciate the benefits of such opportunities that inure to 
their students and their classes, and even their exam grading. Students in large 
section classes who have realized success from their more creative moments 
are more likely to try creativity again and in different settings; the large class 
will be less likely to restrict its expression to "safe" statements; and their 
exam-writing is more likely to evidence some independence of thought. 
Without sufficient opportunities to experience success and teachers 
sensitive enough to take advantage of them, we can fairly expect that the 
students who do best on our final examinations will be those who listened 
carefully, studied hard, and returned to us in their examination answers what 
we gave them by way of information.17 With such opportunities, we can 
expect that the students who do best on our examinations will not merely 
return what we gave them, but will also return the product of an active, 
critical mind, fresh to the fray with the law and its intricacies that the faculty 
wages in its scholarship and the practicing bar and bench wage in times of 
great moment. 
17. D' Amato's Professor Jones would delight at reading such a paper. Professor 
Smith would be unfulfilled. D'Amato, supra note 3, at 479. 
